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frained from doing so because he
was in his underwear. Thus, ample
evidence existed to conclude that the
repossession did not result in a
breach of the peace.

Trespass onto debtor's
property is not per se
reach of the peace
Koontz alternatively argued that
Chrysler breached the peace by
repossessing his vehicle in a manner
which constituted criminal trespass
to real property under Section 21-3
of the Illinois Criminal Code. Under
the Criminal Code, criminal trespass
occurs when a person enters upon
the land of another, despite having
received prior notice from that

individual that such entry is forbidden. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/21-3 (West 1994). Prior to the date
of repossession, Koontz informed
Chrysler that it did not have his
permission to enter upon his land;
consequently, he contended that
Chrysler's potentially sanctionable
criminal trespass amounted, at the
very least, to a breach of the peace.
The court found the issue to be
one of first impression in Illinois
and, thus, proceeded to examine the
relevant law from other jurisdictions. The court concluded that a
mere trespass, in and of itself, does
not result in a breach of the peace
because the creditor enjoys a limited
privilege, confined in purpose and in
scope, to enter upon the land of a
debtor. The court instructed that

where the collateral is enclosed in
some fashion, i.e., by fence, gate,
chain, etc., the secured creditor's
privilege is severely diminished,
especially where repossession can
only be accomplished by breaking
down the barriers designed to
exclude potential trespassers.
The court evaluated Chrysler's
entry upon Koontz's real property in
light of these considerations and did
not find a breach of the peace under
the circumstances. Chrysler's entry
was limited to the purpose of
repossession, and there was no
evidence to indicate that any
barricades or enclosures had been
transgressed. Therefore, Chrysler
exercised its privilege lawfully and
the deficiency judgment stands
unaffected.

Banks and lenders violated consumer protection
laws with direct deposit accounts
by Aaron R. Pettit
In Cobb v. Monarch Fin. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1164
(N.D. III. 1995), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that the owner of a
bank account, to which an allotted portion of the
owner's paycheck was directly deposited and then
immediately transferred to a lender, could state a cause
of action against both the bank and the lender for
violating disclosure requirements of the Electronics
Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r
(1988), and for deceptive practices under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act ("ICFA"),
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1-505/12 (1993). The court
also held, however, that the owner of such an account
could not state a cause of action against the bank for
failure to meet disclosure requirements under the Truth
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in Savings Act ("TISA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313
(1995), against the lender under the Truth in Lending
Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988), and
against both the bank and the lender under the Illinois
Wage Assignment Act ("IWAA"), 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 170/.01- 170/11 (1993). Additionally, the court
upheld the plaintiff's claim against the lender that the
loan agreements were unconscionable, but dismissed the
unconscionability claim against the bank.
From November 1993 to November 1994, Verlina
Cobb ("Cobb") obtained a total of ten different loans
from three finance companies ("the lenders"). As
specified in the loan agreements, three banks ("the
banks") created bank accounts in Cobb's name and
electronically and directly deposited an allocated portion
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of Cobb's paycheck into the accounts. The banks then
immediately transferred this portion from Cobb's
account to the lenders' account as payment for the loans.
Cobb filed for bankruptcy on February 3, 1995. At the
time, Cobb had not fully repaid her loans. After filing
for bankruptcy, Cobb filed actions against the banks, the
lenders, and officers of both the banks and the lenders.
Cobb filed a motion to certify three separate classes,
constituting all persons who entered into finance
agreements with the lenders and into account authorizations with the banks. Despite the defendants' opposition,
the court granted Cobb's motion to certify the classes.

Plaintiff claims violations of consumer
protection laws
Cobb asserted several causes of action: (1) the banks
and the lenders violated the disclosure requirements of
the EFTA; (2) the lenders did not inform Cobb that they
had procured a security interest in her bank accounts as
required under the TILA; (3) the banks did not meet the
disclosure requirements of the TISA; (4) the banks and
the lenders executed a wage assignment from Cobb
without providing notice as required under the IWAA;
(5) the banks and the lenders engaged in a deceptive
practice in violation of the ICFA; and (6) the banks and
lenders entered into unconscionable loan agreements
with Cobb under Illinois law. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss each of Cobb's counts.

Electronic Funds Transfer Act applies
The court first held that Cobb could state a cause of
action against the banks and the lenders for violating
provision of the EFTA. The defendants argued that
Cobb's EFTA claim should be dismissed because Cobb's
bank accounts were not "accounts" as defined in the
EFTA. Pursuant to its authority under the EFTA, the
Federal Reserve Board defined "account" in a set of
regulations commonly referred to as "Regulation E," a
consumer account "established primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes." 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(25) (1996). The court held that the lenders'
interest in Cobb's accounts did not amount to a security
interest in the property because the banks created the
accounts for repayment of the loans, not to secure
repayment upon default. Therefore, the court granted the

1996

lenders' motion to dismiss Cobb's cause of action under
the TMA.

Banks did not violate the Truth in
Savings Act
In addition, the court held that Cobb could not state a
cause of action against the banks for failure to meet the
disclosure requirements of the TISA. Since the TISA's
definition of "account" is substantially the same as the
definition used in the EFTA and Regulation E, the court
found that Cobb's account constituted an "account"
under the TISA. The banks contended, however, that
even if the accounts applied under the TISA's disclosure
provisions, Cobb waived any right to obtain the disclosures in signing the loan agreements. Cobb argued that
the disclosure requirements could not be waived. The
court rejected Cobb's argument, citing a Supreme Court
case in which the Court held that waiver is presumed to
be available unless the statute contains an express
prohibition of waiver. Untied States v. Mezzanatto, 1 15
S. Ct. 797, 801 (1995). Since the TISA contains no such
preclusion of waiver, the court held that Cobb waived
her rights to receive account statements or transaction
reports regarding the loan agreements. Accordingly, the
court granted the bank defendants' motion to dismiss the
TISA cause of action.

Direct deposit account constitutes a valid
assignment of wages
The court further held that Cobb could not state a
cause of action under the IWAA. The IWAA invalidates
an "assignment of wages earned or to be earned" unless
"[gliven to secure an existing debt of the wage-earner."
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/1(2) (1993). Additionally,
the IWAA requires creditors to give notice before they
can collect wages under a wage assignment. The court
interpreted the IWAA to apply only to wage assignments
used to "secure" debt and intended as security upon
default of a loan. The court found that the wage assignments in the present case were not designed to "secure"
debt or to provide the lenders with security upon default
and, therefore, the IWAA did not apply to the wage
assignments in Cobb's case. Accordingly, the court
granted the lender defendants' motion to dismiss the
IWAA count.
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Plaintiff sufficiently alleged fraud
Conversely, the court held that Cobb could state a
cause of action against the banks and the lenders for
violations of the ICFA. The ICFA prohibits "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices," including misrepresentation, fraud, false promise, and concealment. 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1993). Cobb claimed that the
defendants "agreed to... [f]alsely represent to plaintiff
and the class members that they could not revoke their
authorizations to have the payments transferred to the
finance company's account" and that the defendants
required the plaintiff to sign a waiver of her rights to
stop the electronic fund transfers. Section 205.10, a
regulation passed pursuant to the EFTA, provides that a
consumer has a non-waivable right to stop an electronic
fund transfer from her account. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10
(1996). Furthermore, Cobb alleged that the defendants
avoided disclosing required information to Cobb about
her accounts by requiring her to sign a waiver of any
rights to obtain account statements or transaction reports
regarding the accounts, in violation of the EFTA.
The defendants argued that Cobb's allegations did not
meet the heightened particularity standards of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for claims of fraud
because the claims did not specify which defendants
were involved in the fraud. The court rejected this
argument, citing an exception to the particularity
requirement where corporate insiders are involved and
where the involvement of each is within the sole
knowledge of the defendants. In such cases, the plaintiff
is not required to specifically allege the involvement of
each defendant. Thus, the court held that Cobb could
state a claim against the defendants under the ICFA and
dismissed the defendants' motion to dismiss the ICFA
claims.

Loan agreements deemed

unconscionable
Furthermore, the court held that Cobb could not state
a cause of action for unconscionability against the banks
but could state a cause of action for unconscionability
against the lenders. In Illinois, a contract is "unconscionable when it is so one-sided that only one under
delusion would make it and only one unfair and dishonest would accept it." In re Estate of Croake, 578 N.E.2d
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567, 569 (II1.App. Ct. 1991). Cobb alleged that the
"combined effect of the extraordinarily high interest
rates charged, the systematic violation of consumer
protection laws.., made all of the loans at issue
unconscionable." The court concluded, however, that
Cobb's complaint failed to allege that the banks were
parties to the loan contracts or that they played any part
in the creation of the loans. Further, the court held that
the banks' activities fell short of the "systematic
violations of consumer protection laws" and granted the
banks' motion to dismiss the unconscionability claim.
The court stated, however, that it was unable to hold
as a matter of law that Cobb did not state a claim for
unconscionability against the lenders. Cobb alleged that
the combination of the unreasonably high interest rates
and the violations of consumer protection laws made the
agreements with the lenders unconscionable. The court
stated that the annual percentage rates charged by the
lenders, which ranged from 57% to 101%, appeared to
be unreasonably favorable and that Cobb may have
lacked meaningful choice. As a result, the court denied
the lender defendants' motion to dismiss the
unconscionability claim.
In summary, the court granted the banks' motions to
dismiss the TISA, IWAA, and unconscionability claims
but denied the banks' motions to dismiss the EFTA and
ICFA claims. Furthermore, the court granted the lenders'
motions to dismiss the TILA and IWAA claims but
denied the lenders' motions to dismiss the EFTA, ICFA,
and unconscionability claims.
Editor'sNote: On March 11, 1996, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division granted summary judgment to Bank
One Chicago on the EFTA claim, and denied summary
judgment on the ICFA claim. Cobb v. Monarch Fin.
Corp., 1996 WL 109624 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 1996).
Considering the EFTA claim first, the court held that
there was no genuine issue as to how the direct deposits
were handled. The mere existence of the direct deposit
form did not rebut the fact that no account was created
for Cobb. The court stated that Bank One did not need
to provide transaction disclosures under EFTA because
no transfers were effected. Cobb did not receive credit
from Bank One, nor was credit conditioned on repayment by electronic transfer. The bank did not enter into
the agreement, thereby waiving Cobb's rights under the
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EFTA. Under the IFCA claim, the court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court
assessed the statutory text, and cited Kedziora v.
Citicorp Nat'l Servs., 780 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Il1.
1991) for the proposition that a deceptive practice may
be one that is "misleading," and whether or not a
business form is misleading is a question of fact. The

court found that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
direct deposit form misleading. Additionally, the court
declined to find as a matter of law that Cobb did not
suffer damages from the repayment arrangement.
Reconsideration of the matter was denied on June 6,
1996. Cobb v. Monarch Fin. Corp., 1996 WL 308279
(N.D. Ill. June 6, 1996).

Accident victims' right to privacy upheld over
attorneys"free speech rights
by Sara E. Neff
Attorneys must wait 30 days to solicit Texas accident
victims and their families through the mail. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
rejected the proposition that a 30-day ban on attorneys'
direct mail solicitation of accident victims or their
families is unconstitutional in Moore v. Morales, 63
F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995). In an action between attorneys
and various commercial entities and the Attorney
General of Texas, the United States Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's ruling in favor of the
attorneys. The court of appeals concluded that a Texas
statute prohibiting attorneys from direct mail solicitation
of accident victims or their families within 30 days of
the accident advanced Texas' interest in protecting the
privacy of accident victims and their loved ones and did
not violate the attorneys' constitutional right to free
speech.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refused to address the constitutionality of the
statute as applied to other licensed groups such as
physicians, surgeons, chiropractors, and private investigators. The court noted that other groups have not
challenged the ban.

Texas legislature protects privacy of
accident victims
In 1993, the Texas legislature enacted Texas Penal
Code § 38.12(b)(l), which limits the right of several
groups of licensed professionals, including attorneys, to
solicit accident victims or their families. TEX. PENAL
1996

CODE § 38.12(b)(1) (1994). The provisions of this
statute serve several functions. First, the statute prevents
licensed professionals from soliciting accident victims
directly through the mail until 30 days have passed.
Second, the statute restricts accident report access for
180 days following an accident and prevents solicitation
of criminal and civil defendants through mail until 30
days after the initiation of legal proceedings. In addition,
the statute enables victims to indicate, on the face of the
accident report, whether they wish to be solicited.

District court found 30-day ban on
solicitation unconstitutional
The attorneys challenged the 1993 statute on the
grounds that it violated their right under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
district court agreed, finding that the provisions of the
statute presented an unreasonable impediment to
commercial free speech. Thus, the district court declared
the challenged provisions of the statute unconstitutional.

The 30-day ban must satisfy
constitutional test
On appeal, the court tested the 30-day ban for
constitutionality using the three prong test established in
CentralHudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). In order to hold the 30-day ban on
attorneys' direct mail solicitation of accident victims and
their families constitutional, the court must find (1) a
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